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I. “I ACCEPT”?
Syed Imran Ahmed is a medical doctor licensed to practice
medicine and conduct surgery in the state of New York. 1 Dr. Ahmed
specializes in weight loss surgeries and operates out of a private

Juris Doctor Candidate 2016, The John Marshall Law School; B.A. 2013,
University of Illinois at Chicago. I would like to thank my family for their
continued love and support. I would also like to thank Professor Hugh Mundy
for introducing me to this topic, as well as for providing constant guidance and
encouragement.
1 Complaint & Affidavit in Support of Application for Arrest & Search
Warrants at 5, United States v. Ahmed, No. 14-cr-00277-DLI, (E.D.N.Y. March
24, 2014)[hereinafter Complaint & Affidavit].
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office located in a New York suburb. 2 Several of Dr. Ahmed’s
patients use Medicare, a federally funded program that provides
medical benefits and payment assistance to persons over sixty-five
or persons with certain disabilities. 3 Allegedly, Dr. Ahmed
submitted claims for reimbursement to Medicare for surgeries he
never performed and treatments he never provided.4 As Dr. Ahmed
sits in prison awaiting trial for his alleged Medicare misconduct, his
lawyer, Morris Fodeman, sits in court fighting a very different
battle.5 Mr. Fodeman’s struggle concerns the attorney-client
privilege and emails sent between Dr. Ahmed and himself. 6 In one
hearing Judge Irizarry stated:
THE COURT: But that’s not even what you [the prosecution] say in
your letter, because in your letter you indicate that while you are
agreeing not to read any of the attorney-client e-mails in this case
that were sent prior to the date of your letter, which is June 16, but
that you intend to do it moving forward.7

Mr. Fodeman received interesting correspondence from the
prosecutor working on Dr. Ahmed’s case prior to this court hearing.8
The prosecutor indicated that the government obtained and
planned to read emails exchanged between Mr. Fodeman and Dr.
Ahmed while Dr. Ahmed remained incarcerated. 9
The Bureau of Prisons allows Dr. Ahmed, as well as other
inmates, to send emails while incarcerated through the TRULINCS
email system.10 The system contains the following warning and
requires the inmate to click “I accept” before using the TRULINCS
email system:

Id.
Id. at 6; see also MEDICARE.GOV, www.medicare.gov/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2015) (discussing how the Medicare program works and the proper way to sign
up and use it).
4 Complaint & Affidavit, supra note 1, at 9. “Under 18 U.S.C. § 1347, it is
illegal to knowingly and willfully execute and attempt to execute a scheme and
artifice to defraud Medicare and to obtain and attempt to obtain by means of
false and fraudulent pretenses. . .” Id. at 5.
5 Transcript of Criminal Cause for Status Conference Before the Honorable
Dora L. Irizarry United States District Judge at 5, United States v. Ahmed, No.
14-cr-00277-DLI (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2014)[hereinafter Transcript].
6 Id.
7 Id. at 9.
8 Brief of United States at 5, United States v. Ahmed, No. 14-cr-00277-DLI
(E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2014) [hereinafter Brief of United States I].
9 Id.
10 Brief of United States at 1, United States v. Ahmed, No. 14-cr-00277-DLI
(E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2014)[hereinafter Brief of United States II]; see also
TRULINCS
FAQs,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
www.2600.wrepp.com/2600/Links/29/3/www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/trulincs
_faq.jsp.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (stating that inmate emails are
monitored and that inmates must consent to the monitoring before using the
email system.)
2
3
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The Department may monitor any activity on the system and retrieve
any information stored within the system. By accessing and using
this computer, I am consenting to such monitoring and information
retrieval for law enforcement and other purposes. I have no
expectation of privacy as to my communication on or information
stored with the system . . . I understand and consent that this
provision applies to electronic messages both to and from my attorney
or other legal representative, and that such electronic messages will
not be treated as privileged communications, and I have alternative
methods of conducting privileged legal communications.11

Mr. Fodeman argued that the government should not be able
to read the emails between him and Dr. Ahmed for four reasons. 12
First, Mr. Fodeman argued the extensive nature of the case and the
sheer volume of information provided a need for privileged email
communication.13 Second, he argued that the defendant’s lack of
resources in comparison to the government’s resources make it
nearly impossible for him to use other methods of communication
besides email.14 Third, he contended that privileged email
communication is a necessity as there are endless documents for
each patient that Dr. Ahmed needs to confirm or review while
preparing for trial in prison.15 And lastly, Mr. Fodeman argued that
Dr. Ahmed’s right to contact counsel would be substantially
frustrated without any access to email. 16
Conversely, the prosecutor argued that the TRULINCS system
expressly stated that the communications are not privileged, that
Mr. Fodeman can call or visit Dr. Ahmed if he would like privileged
communication, and that segregating the attorney-client privileged
emails would prove too complicated and costly for the government. 17
The court was not impressed by the prosecutor’s position and
discussed how difficult it is for attorneys to communicate with
inmates in ways other than email due to the many restrictions and
scheduling conflicts.18 Ultimately, Judge Irizarry decided the
Brief of United States II, supra note 10, at 2.
Brief of Morris Fodeman, United States v. Ahmed, No. 14-cr-00277-DLI
(E.D.N.Y June 20, 2014).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Transcript, supra note 5, at 5-11.
18 Id. at 19-20. The transcript reflects the difficulties of setting up an inmate
phone call or in person meeting. Id.
11
12

The Court: [B]ut it is not an easy thing to arrange for an unmonitored
attorney call. . . And then he [Mr. Fodeman] has to initiate the call.
Then the Bureau of Prisons, by the time they feel like it, has to
arrange for a private room, arrange for the call. And, again, if a
security nightmare happens, that’s the end of it, everybody’s on
lockdown and the call doesn’t happen. But I have heard from
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attorney-client privilege protected the emails from the prosecutor’s
eyes.19 This issue, whether inmate emails are protected under the
attorney-client privilege, is creating novel and complex courtroom
battles in courts across the country, long before the merits of the
case are even discussed.20
This Comment addresses whether the attorney-client privilege
should extend to emails exchanged between an inmate and his or
her attorney over TRULINCS, the prison email system. Section II
describes the history of the attorney-client privilege, and compares
and contrasts the federal privilege with the New York state
privilege in order to directly address Dr. Ahmed’s conflict. Section
III juxtaposes other forms of privileged attorney-client contact with
inmate emailing, and discusses the confidentiality agreement
provided through the prison email system, TRULINCS. Finally,
Section IV proposes a fiscally responsible, efficient, and convenient
solution to the possible extension of the attorney-client privilege to
inmate email.

II. THE HISTORY OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege originated in England in the
sixteenth century; it was first implemented in the United States in
the nineteenth century as a way of protecting both the client and

respected members of the CJA panel that this is not an unusual
occurrence.
Id.
19 Id. at 21.
20 Stephanie Clifford, Prosecutors Are Reading Emails from Inmates to
Lawyers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
22,
2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/us-is-reading-inmates-email-sent-tolawyers.html; see also Editorial Board, Inmate E-mails to Lawyers Must Be
Protected By Attorney-Client Privilege, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2014),
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/inmate-e-mails-to-lawyers-must-beprotected-by-attorney-client-privilege-2014/08/30/2c295bec-143b-11e4-98eedaea85133bc9_story.html (discussing the opinion of one judge who stated that
inmates “had no expectation of privacy,” and the opinion of another judge who
“wrote that ‘the government’s policy does not “unreasonably interfere” with
…[the] ability to consult counsel’”; The Editorial Board, Prosecutors Snooping
on
Legal
Mail,
N.Y. TIMES
(July
23,
2014),
www.nytimes
com/2014/07/24/opinion/24thu3.html (explaining the different views judges
have developed with regard to prosecutors reading inmate emails). Some federal
judges have accepted the government’s contention that inmates have other
means of communication and separating emails is too costly. Id. Meanwhile,
other federal judges have ruled against the government, citing the fact that
prosecutors have extensive resources as compared to private lawyers. Id. This
disparity makes it nearly impossible for many private lawyers to use other
means to communicate with inmates—such as prison visits or prison phone
calls. Id. These other means often prove too costly, time-consuming, and
unreliable. Id.
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the administration of justice.21 This Section discusses the various
forms of the attorney-client privilege, including the boundaries of,
and exceptions to, the privilege.

A. Common Law
The first United States case dealing with the attorney-client
privilege was Hunt v. Blackburn in 1888.22 Hunt arose from a
property dispute, but ultimately turned on whether a letter between
the defendant and her attorney could be introduced as evidence at
trial.23 The court stated that the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to provide for confidential communications between an
attorney and his or her client, which is needed to facilitate a just,
efficient, and contemporary legal system. 24 Ultimately, the Hunt
court found that the defendant waived her attorney-client
privilege.25 Because of the strong public policy that favors protecting
client rights, courts often decide difficult or “blurred line” cases in
favor of upholding the privilege and protecting the information. 26
The privilege helps to promote honest conversation and full
disclosure between an attorney and his or her client, which allows
for more open and efficient representation. 27
Various elements must be satisfied in order to invoke the
attorney-client privilege. A defendant is required to show that:
(1) he or she was or sought to be a client of the attorney;
21 PAUL RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. § 1:1 (2014),
available at Westlaw 1 Attorney-Client Privilege in the U.S. § 1:1; see also
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (discussing that the
attorney-client privilege was one of the first common law privileges); see
generally 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
(Colin McNaughton ed., 1961) (explaining the privilege and how it relates to the
rules of evidence as well as trial substance and procedure).
22 Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 469 (1888); see also Sean M. O’Brien,
Note, Extending The Attorney-Client Privilege: Do Internet E-Mail
Communications Warrant a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 4 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 187, 193 (1999) (asserting that the United States common
law first identified the attorney-client privilege in 1888).
23 Hunt, 128 U.S. at 471.
24 Id. at 470; see AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC
4-1 (1980) (discussing the need for a lawyer to be able to advocate for his or her
client and provide sound legal advice and representation).
25 Hunt, 128 U.S. at 471.
26 Compare Lopes v. Vieira, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1058, 1068 (E.D. Cal.
2010) (taking a more wide-spread and liberal approach to applying the attorneyclient privilege, thereby protecting more documents from disclosure), with
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)
(suggesting that the privilege should be narrowly construed so that most
evidence is disclosed, unless upholding the privilege by not disclosing better
advances or protects public policy concerns).
27 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348
(1985).
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(2) that the attorney in connection with the evidence acted as a lawyer;
(3) that the evidence relates to facts communicated for the purpose of
securing a legal opinion, legal services or assistance in a legal proceeding;
and
(4) that the privilege has not been waived.28

The party that wishes to raise the privilege must prove that all
of the elements listed above existed at the time the communication
took place.29 The court has discretion in deciding whether the
claimant met his or her burden of proving each and every element
of the privilege based on a factual determination. 30 A lower court’s
finding of privilege will not be overturned unless the finding is
“clearly erroneous.”31 However, the application of the privilege is a
question of law.32 Therefore, there is a bifurcated standard of
review.33
The privilege only shields communications that provide or
further legal advice between an attorney and his or her client. 34
However, the privilege is not lost if some parts of the communication
contain non-legal advice.35 Conversely, if the communications
contain purely non-legal or business advice then they are not
protected by the attorney-client privilege.36 A court looks to the
following factors to determine if the communicated information is
for purely or predominantly legal advice purposes: “(1) the extent to
which the attorney performs legal and non-legal work for the
organization, (2) the nature of the communication, and (3) whether
or not the attorney had previously provided legal assistance relating

28 United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing United
States Shoe Mach, Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358-359; Connelly v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 96 F.R.D. 339, 341 (D. Mass. 1982)).
29 United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc. 874 F.2d
20, 28 (1st Cir. 1989).
30 Wilson, 798 F.2d at 512; see generally FED. R. EVID. 104 (explaining how
courts deal with finding privilege).
31 Wilson, 798 F.2d at 512.
32 See generally FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing legal rules as to how the
attorney-client privilege is established).
33 Wilson, 798 F.2d at 512; see generally FED. R. EVID. 501 (discussing the
two-tiered standard of review: the first tier being the common law power of
courts deciding if the attorney-client privilege exists based on case facts, and
the second tier being the legal rules governing how the privilege is to be properly
applied).
34 United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 359.
35 Id. See also United States v. Singhal, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C 2011)
(discussing that when considering communications which contain both legal
and non-legal advice the information will be privileged only if the predominant
purpose is for providing legal advice); In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kansas
City Bd. of Pub. Util., 246 F.R.D. 673, 678 (D. Kan. 2007) (asserting that the
privilege only exists to protect legal advice and should be narrowly construed in
order to serve this purpose).
36 Singhal, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
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to the same matter.”37 However, even when the attorney-client
privilege applies, several avenues still remain for dissolving the
privilege.
1. Waiver
Once a court finds that the attorney-client privilege applies,
one way to seek disclosure of the privileged information is through
waiver.38 Only the client can waive the privilege.39 For instance, the
privilege is waived when the client voluntarily discloses the
privileged information to someone other than his or her attorney. 40
For example, in United States v. Mejia,41 the court held that the
client waived his privilege when he called his sister from prison and
provided her with information meant for his attorney, instead of
just calling his attorney directly.42 The court ruled that because he
knew his call was being recorded over the prison phone system and
because the information was detailed to his sister rather than to his
attorney, the privilege was destroyed.43 The presence of a third
party, however, does not always destroy the privilege. 44 For
example, the privilege is not destroyed if the purpose of telling or
showing the information to a third party is to aid in clarifying
communications between the lawyer and client, such as assisting in
translation or helping to overcome some form of communicative
disability.45 In addition to waiver, there is also a crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege.46
37 Id. See, e.g., In re Cty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 422 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding
that emails between a lawyer and a client detailing the recommendations by
the lawyer for company policy is protected correspondence under the attorneyclient privilege).
38 Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Bedford Reinforced Plastics, Inc., 227
F.R.D. 382, 390 (W.D. Pa. 2005). See e.g., Dealbook, Another View: The Eroding
Attorney-Client Privilege, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2009, 11:00 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/02/another-view-the-eroding-attorneyclient-privilege/comment-page-1/?_r=0 (providing a current insight into how
lawyers, clients, and courts deal with the attorney-client privilege and waiver
in a corporate setting). Specifically, the article discusses the viewpoints of the
court, the client, and the attorney in regards to Bank of America’s waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. Id.
39 Martin, 227 F.R.D. at 390.
40 Id. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 185 (2d Cir.
2000) (finding that the attorney-client privilege was waived when a corporate
officer provided privileged testimony to a grand jury); Phx. Solutions Inc. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 254 F.R.D. 568, 576 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that the
attorney-client privilege was waived when the client voluntarily submitted
privileged documents to another party during a patent application process).
41 United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 133 (2d Cir. 2011).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 134.
45 Id.
46 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
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2. Crime-Fraud Exception
The attorney-client privilege does not protect criminal plans or
criminal acts between an attorney and his client. 47 To invoke the
exception, the government need only prove that the client consulted
an attorney regarding a crime he was planning to commit, and not
that an actual crime occurred or was already in motion. 48 The
attorney need not know about the client’s plans to engage in
criminal activity because it is the client’s intentions that are
paramount in deciding if the crime-fraud exception applies.49
The crime-fraud exception dissolves the attorney-client
privilege if “there is reasonable cause to believe that the attorney’s
services were utilized in furtherance of the ongoing unlawful
scheme.”50 For example, in United States v. Doe,51 the Third Circuit
ruled that the crime-fraud exception dissolved the attorney-client
privilege.52 This case involved a grand jury investigation of a
government agent.53 Per the investigation, an attorney was
subpoenaed to provide documentation that the government agent
asked him for assistance to commit a crime—he refused, claiming
that the information was privileged.54 The court acknowledged that
there was evidence that the government agent had a criminal intent
in speaking with his attorney, because he asked how to invest in a
business under his wife’s name so that the investment could not be

Michael W. Glenn, Note, Principles, Politics and Privilege: How the CrimeFraud Exception Can Preserve the Strength of the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Government Lawyers and Their Clients, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1447, 1477
(2013) (discussing the attorney-client privilege, the public policy surrounding it,
and how the crime-fraud exception and the attorney-client privilege apply in
criminal settings). Furthermore, Michael Glenn’s article stresses the
importance of the attorney-client privilege for the attorney and his or her client,
as well as the public-at-large. Id. at 1482.
47 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d at 381.
48 Id.
49 United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002).
50 United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996). See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 275 (3d Cir. 2006) (waiving the
attorney-client privilege because the crime-fraud exception applied when the
government produced evidence to show the client was engaged in obstructing
justice); United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 619 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
the attorney-client privilege should be divested because the client sought
counsel to help cover up a fraud scheme); Shahinian v. Tankian, 242 F.R.D. 255,
261 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (concluding that the client contacted a law firm in order to
aid in their fraudulent filings with the IRS, which therefore dissolved the
attorney-client privilege due to the crime-fraud exception).
51 United States v. Doe, 429 F.3d 450, 454 (3d. Cir. 2005).
52 Id. (stating that “[a]lthough broad, the privilege does not allow a client to
shield evidence of an intent to use an attorney’s advice for criminal purposes”).
53 Id. at 452.
54 Id.
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traced back to him.55 Even though the crime was never actually
committed, the government established the crime-fraud exception
to the attorney-client privilege by introducing evidence of the
client’s intent.56

B. Statutes
The attorney-client privilege is also codified several places in
statutory law.57 For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide
for the privilege and discuss its application, waiver, and different
forms of disclosure.58 Moreover, different states have crafted their
own statutes governing the application and use of the privilege.59 In
particular, Illinois Evidence Rule 502 defines and discusses the
attorney-client privilege and waiver.60 Like the common law, Rule
502 only gives the client the right to waive the privilege, but it also
discusses the connection between the privilege and its application
in Illinois courts as compared to other jurisdictions. 61
It is important to note that the privilege is a combination of
statutory and common law because it greatly affects, and is affected
by, the discovery process at trial. 62 As technology evolves, both the
federal and state legislatures have worked to amend their attorneyclient privilege statutes to keep trial discovery costs down and trial
ease and efficiency up.63 However, this has created some
confusion.64 The privilege can vary significantly from jurisdiction to
55 Id. at 454; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 208 (West 1994) (discussing the rules a federal
officer must follow in regard to an outside financial interest).
56 Doe, 429 F.3d at 455.
57 FED. R. EVID. 501.
58 FED. R. EVID. 502.
59 See, e.g., ILL. R. EVID. 502 (providing the statutory rules for the attorneyclient privilege in Illinois); ARIZ. R. EVID. 502 (setting forth the rules of evidence
governing the attorney-client privilege in Arizona); TEX. R. EVID. 503 (stating
the Texas rules of evidence for the attorney-client privilege); ALA. R. EVID. 503
(providing Alaska’s evidentiary statute for the attorney-client privilege).
60 ILL. R. EVID. 502.
61 See id. (defining and discussing the privilege in regard to how it is applied
in Illinois).
62 Robert A. Brown, Comment, The Amended Attorney-Client Privilege in
Oklahoma: A Misstep in the Right Direction, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 279, 281 (2011).
63 Id. at 280 (stating “[n]ow confidential information is often stored on the
same discrete hard drive as information over which no privilege will be claimed,
even if the information is kept in different ‘files’”).
64 Steven Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Territorial Solution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 909, 912 (1991) (discussing the choiceof-law doctrine in connection to the attorney-client privilege). The article
emphasizes the underlying need for consistency in order for the privilege to have
value. Id. at 913. However, the article further discusses how the privilege’s
conflicting application inhibits this value. Id. 921-22. The attorney-client
privilege is regulated by each state individually to comply with that particular
states’ interest, which then creates state-to-state inconsistency. Id.
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jurisdiction,65 but there is uniformity across some jurisdictions. 66
These variations in the boundaries of the privilege prevent the
privilege from working effectively, and make it difficult for
attorneys to know when it applies to client correspondence.67 As
electronic discovery and different technological modes of
communication become more prevalent, various issues regarding
the attorney-client privilege arise and call for amending federal and
state statutes, along with the rules of evidence.68

C. Federal Law versus State Law
Ordinarily, federal law governs the attorney-client privilege in
federal court.69 However, under the Federal Rule of Evidence 501, a
federal district court sitting in diversity should apply the law of
privilege of the state in which it sits.70 Furthermore, state courts
can formulate their own laws for the attorney-client privilege,
unbound by the federal guidelines of the attorney-client privilege.71
1. The Federal Privilege
Federal law provides the minimum amount of attorney-client
protection that must be provided to a client. 72 As discussed above,
65 See O’Brien, supra note 22, and accompanying text (identifying that the
attorney-client privilege is partly a product of common law and, therefore, each
state can handle it differently).
66 Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 60 (2002);
see also infra note 91 (discussing the similarities between New York State’s
attorney-client privilege and the Federal attorney-client privilege).
67 Glynn, supra note 66 at 82-83. “Policy makers therefore should strive to
ensure the highest level of certainty achievable, while recognizing that the
competing interests at stake will require some doctrinal complexity, and that
no legal doctrine, including privilege law, is entirely predictable or without
nuances in application.” Id. at 82.
68 See generally Adjoa Linzy, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Discovery of
Electronically-Stored Information, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV 1 (2011)
(discussing how the evolution of technology used in discovery causes the
attorney-client privilege to change positively by making it easier and more
efficient to exchange documents and privileged communications, and negatively
by blurring the lines of the privilege and document disclosure).
69 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN
HERSHKOFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES & MATERIALS 1367, 907 (11th ed. 2013).
70 Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 501 (explaining that “state law governs privilege
regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision”);
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (asserting in common law that
a federal court sitting in diversity shall apply the substantive law of the state
in which it sits).
71 FED. R. EVID. 501.
72 See generally 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
501.02
(2d
ed.
1987),
available
at
https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=f357012e-a1ca4f22-bf8e-
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both federal statutes and federal common law work to shape the
privilege.73 For example, Federal Rules of Evidence 501 and 502
define the privilege, discuss the boundaries of the privilege, and
introduce the exceptions to the privilege.74 Federal common law also
discusses the attorney-client privilege.75 For example, in Fisher v.
United States, the Supreme Court of the United States applied
federal common law regarding the attorney-client privilege and
held that tax documents were not privileged.76
The federal common law also extends the attorney-client
privilege to the corporate world.77 As communication continues to
evolve, the federal common law recognizes that several different
technological modes of communication, such as phone calls and
email are covered under the attorney-client privilege.78 However, no
medium of communication makes the privilege absolute and the
court reserves the right to deal with the application of the attorneyclient privilege on a case-by-case basis.79
2. New York State Privilege
The attorney-client privilege exists in New York State courts

95595cc5522b&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalyticalmaterials%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A51PW-T5R0-R03K-Y3K8-0000000&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A51PW-T5R0-R03K-Y3K8-0000000&pdcontentcomponentid=163736&ecomp=knthk&earg=sr0&prid=11a472bd
-e2b1-4ddf-b040-62aa3b47120b.
73 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (discussing that the
attorney-client privilege can be found in both statutory law and common law).
74 FED. R. EVID. 501; FED. R. EVID. 502.
75 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 393 (1976) (dealing with
taxpayers under investigation for civil or criminal misconduct dealing with the
Internal Revenue Service). The government summoned the attorneys of those
accused for misconduct and asked for the accused’s tax records and forms. Id.
at 394. The attorneys refused to provide the government with the information.
Id. at 395.
76 Id. at 414.
77 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 384.
78 See United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2003)
(stating that the prosecution cannot use a privileged phone call between an
attorney and his client); see also United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480,
1483 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (stating “[i]f a tape consisted of attorney-client
communications, the outside agent was to immediately seal and segregate that
tape from the others”). See In re City of Erie, 473 F.3d at 422-23 (asserting that
emails sent from a client to their attorney had a predominant purpose of legal
advice because the client was asking an attorney about policy changes and how
to be sure such changes were constitutional.) Therefore, these emails were
protected under the attorney-client privilege because they were about purely
legal matters. Id. However, the client must not have waived the privilege at any
point during the correspondence. Id.
79 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
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through common law,80 the New York rules of evidence,81 and the
New York rules of professional responsibility. 82 New York courts
require the four elements discussed above to invoke the attorneyclient privilege,83 identifying significant public policy reasons
behind the privilege such as full-disclosure and client protection. 84
For example, in In re Jacqueline F.,85 the court ordered an attorney
to disclose the whereabouts of a client and a child in her custody
even though an argument existed that this information was
protected under the New York attorney-client privilege statute.86
The court ruled that the information must be disclosed as public
policy, specifically the best interest of the child, dictates that
disclosure is more important in such circumstances than the
protection of the attorney-client communication regarding the
client’s whereabouts.87 While the privilege is important and
provides the necessary protection to foster client honesty and
communication, it is by no means an absolute shield. 88
Federal law and New York state law appear to deal with the
attorney-client privilege in a very similar manner. 89 Both recognize
80 See Structure of the Courts, NYCOURTS.GOV (Feb. 15, 2013),
www.nycourts.gov/courts/structure.shtml (providing the basic structure of the
New York court system, which differs significantly from other states).
81 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503. (MCKINNEY 2014).
82 See Stacy Lynn Newman, Comment, The Governmental Attorney-Client
Privilege: Whether the Right to Evidence in a State Grand Jury Investigation
Pierces the Privilege in New York State, 70 ALB. L. REV. 741, 744 (2007)
(discussing how the rules of evidence and professional responsibility intersect
with the attorney-client privilege in New York); see also Spectrum Sys. Int’l
Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege is limited to communications); People v. Mitchell, 448
N.E.2d 121, 123 (N.Y. 1983) (discussing that the privilege only applies when the
client was engaged in receiving legal advice from the attorney); People v. Osorio,
549 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (N.Y. 1989) (stating the party claiming the attorneyclient privilege has the burden of proving all of the elements).
83 See Wilson, 798 F.2d 509 (discussing the elements of the attorney-client
privilege).
84 Newman, supra note 82, at 751.
85 In re Jacqueline F., 391 N.E.2d 967 (1979).
86 Id. at 972. See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503 (2014), available at
https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=08dddb28-b834407d-b5bfacf6fccb8606&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fstatuteslegislation%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4YF7-FPK1-NRF4-20BV-0000000&pdpinpoint=_a&pdcontentcomponentid=9101&pddoctitle=N.Y.+C.P.L.R.+
4503%28a%29&ecomp=qk9g&prid=cf9e3bfd-a878-4ddf-a7d9-e41113fe2042
(providing the definition and application of the New York state attorney-client
privilege).
87 In re Jacqueline F., 391 N.E.2d at 972.
88 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
89 See VT. R. EVID. 510 (2012) (describing the Vermont rule entitled “lawyerclient” privilege, which provides different language than the New York rule);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 955 (West 2014) (discussing when the attorney must invoke
the privilege, which is different than the New York rule). But see IND. R. EVID.
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common law and statutory forms and have very similar
guidelines.90 Moreover, because New York follows the federal
protections in lockstep, it appears both jurisdictions would rule
similarly, if not identically, in a case involving an attorney-client
privilege dispute.

III. MEDIUMS OF COMMUNICATION AND THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE
This Section explores, analyzes, and reviews the facts,
outcome, and rationale employed by several New York state and
federal courts in cases involving the attorney-client privilege. This
section seeks to ascertain the bounds of the privilege by looking at
written, oral, and electronic communications in both prison and
civilian contexts.

A. Telephone
The telephone is commonly used by attorneys and clients to
communicate easily and effectively under the attorney-client
privilege.91 However, the rapid advancement of telephone
technology has caused the application of the attorney-client
privilege to telephone conversations to be a regularly litigated
issue.92 Although two people engaged in a telephone conversation
may generally expect a reasonable degree of privacy with regard to
their conversation,93 the issue of inadvertent disclosure has lead
501 (2014) (stating the Indiana rule of evidence that discusses the attorneyclient privilege, which is very similar to the New York and Federal rules).
90 Compare FED. R. EVID 502 (defining the attorney-client privilege as
something that protects privileged communication between an attorney and his
or her client, as well as the applicable notions of waiver and application), with
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503 (discussing how the attorney-client privilege protects
clients by allowing them to have privileged information with their attorney, as
well as providing for waiver of the privilege by the client and an application
similar to Federal law).
91 Heidi L. McNeil & Robert A. Henry, Confidential Communication?
Cellular and Cordless Telephones and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 34 ARIZ
ATT’Y 20 (1997), available at www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/Archives/Oct97/1097a3.htm.
92 Id. at 21. “Unfortunately, too many attorneys are embracing these gifts of
modern technology without careful consideration of how they should be used.
By now, everyone knows–or should know—that a cellular or cordless
conversation is as private as a chat in the bleachers at Wrigley Field.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
93 See generally Jason D. Lerner, State Constitutional Law—Privacy—
Search and Seizure—Do Individuals Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
in Their Cell Phone Conversations? State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010),
43 RUTGERS L. J. 725, 733 (2013) (discussing State v. Allen, a case in which the
Montana Supreme Court reasoned that two individuals on a phone-call
normally have a reasonable expectation of privacy).
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various courts to grapple over whether the telephone actually
provides such a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”94 The issue of
whether such an expectation of privacy is reasonable is further
complicated when an inmate is making a phone call to his or her
attorney using the prison phone system. 95 Therefore, ascertaining
the bounds of the privilege outside of prison is a good place to start.
1. Client Phone Call Not Covered Under the Privilege
In People v. Fentress,96 the New York County Court held that
the attorney-client privilege was not applicable to the defendant’s
phone call.97 The defendant called his friend, an attorney, and
confided in him that he had killed someone and was contemplating
committing suicide.98 After learning this information the attorney
called his own mother, who called the defendant herself, before
calling the police.99 The police arrived at the defendant’s house and
arrested him after they found the body of the victim in the
defendant’s home.100 A grand jury indicted the defendant for
intentional murder.101 The defendant argued that the attorneyclient privilege applied to his phone call, and absent this breach of
the attorney-client privilege no evidence would have existed to
charge him with a crime.102
The court acknowledged that the defendant called his friend
because his friend worked as an attorney and the defendant was
seeking legal advice regarding the murder and his desire to commit
suicide.103 However, the court also reasoned that the attorney’s legal
advice consisted of the defendant calling the police to confess his
crime.104 The court held that the attorney’s legal advice of calling
the police lowered the defendant’s reasonable expectation of
confidentiality in the phone call, because the ultimate legal
suggestion was to disclose all of the information to the
Id.
See Ann Givens & Chris Glorioso, Attorney-Client Privilege Questioned
After Inmate’s Call Is Recorded, NBC NEW YORK (Feb. 4, 2014, 8:51 AM),
www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Attorney-Client-Privilege-Questioned-AfterInmates-Call-is-Recorded-243407341.html (discussing the blurred lines of
whether an inmate should be able to privately speak to his or her attorney over
the inmate phone call system).
96 People v. Fentress, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485, 494 (Cnty. Ct. 1980).
97 Id.; see also People v. Wiesner, 514 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to the defendant’s phone
call because they were not seeking legal advice).
98 Fentress, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 492.
104 Id. at 493.
94
95
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authorities.105 Furthermore, when the attorney’s mother called the
defendant she made no mention that she had spoken to her son, the
attorney whom the defendant had called. 106 Accordingly, because
the defendant openly disclosed his crime and his want to commit
suicide to her, the court ruled that no breach of the attorney-client
privilege existed and the defendant’s conviction was upheld. 107
2. Client Phone Call Covered Under the Privilege
Conversely, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings,108 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled
that the phone calls made from a corporation’s attorney to an
investigator were covered under the attorney-client privilege.109 The
case stemmed from the allegation that a corporation was involved
in illegal gun sales.110 As a result, the corporation hired an
investigator to aid the attorney in dealing with the attorney-client
privilege invoked by the corporation during discovery. 111 The
government argued the attorney-client privilege did not apply to the
phone calls between the investigator hired by the corporation and
the corporation’s attorney because: (1) the phone calls were not
meant to be confidential, (2) the investigator may have aided in
illegal activities, (3) there was no protection provided under agency
theory, and (4) the attorney-client privilege, if applicable, was
waived because the information was provided to third parties. 112
Then, the investigator called an Assistant United States Attorney
and disclosed information received from phone calls and documents
Id. at 494.
The conclusion is inescapable, and the court has found as a fact, that
[defendant] did not intend to keep the corpus of the crime from the police. His
renunciation of confidentiality (as to the fact of the homicide) appeared again
when [the attorney’s mother] suggested that the police be called, and
[defendant] again specifically disavowed any expectation of keeping the fact of
homicide from the police.
Id.
105

Id. at 497.
Id. at 495.
Hence, [the attorney’s mother] was under no legal or ethical duty to refrain
from calling the police. She had not only the defendant’s express approval to do
so, but her own unilateral and unfettered choice in the matter, just as any
person is free to call the police when a friend has confided that he has killed
someone and is about to kill himself.
Id.
106
107

108 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M-11-189, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15646, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001).
109 Id. at *26.
110 Id. at *1.
111 Id.
112 Id. at *9-10.
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with the corporation’s counsel.113
Because the corporation’s counsel told the investigator before
engaging in the phone call that all of the information stated over
the phone was protected by the attorney-client privilege, the court
held the privilege covered the telephone conversations. 114
Additionally, another attorney for the corporation advised the
investigator not to speak with the government because the
corporation planned to assert the attorney-client privilege over the
phone calls.115 Further, the investigator provided grand jury
testimony stating that he did not have the power to waive the
attorney-client privilege, and that he knew the attorney-client
privilege applied to the conversations with the corporation’s
counsel.116 Consequently, the court found that the telephone
conversations between the investigator and the corporation’s
counsel were confidential and therefore were protected by the
attorney-client privilege.117
These two decisions help to illustrate the boundaries of the
attorney-client privilege with regard to telephone calls. 118 The
historical rules governing the privilege provide a test to determine
whether the telephone call is protected or not: (1) there must be an
expectation of privacy, (2) the privilege must not have been waived
and the crime-fraud exception must not apply, and (3) the telephone
call must have taken place with an attorney for the purpose of
seeking legal advice.119 This basic structure appears to blur,
however, when the telephone call is placed from an inmate to his or
her attorney.120
3. Inmate Phone Calls
Even though phone calls between an attorney and his or her
Id. at *11.
Id. at *14.
115 Id.
116 Id. at *18-19. An “[i]nvestigator testified that he believed he was violating
all of Doe Corp.’s instructions and the attorney-client privilege or work-product
doctrine when he had his discussions with AUSA Finn.” Id.
117 Id. at 26.
118 Compare Fentress 425 N.Y.S.2d at 487, with In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646, at *26 (showing how the privilege
works and how it can be applied to different facts).
119 See Fentress, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (providing the basic structure of
analysis that courts use when dealing with telephone conversations in relation
to the attorney-client privilege).
120 See Teri Dobbins, Protecting the Unpopular from the Unreasonable:
Warrantless Monitoring of Attorney Client Communications in Federal Prisons,
53 CATH. U. L. REV. 295, 296 (2004) (discussing the ability of the Bureau of
Prisons to monitor inmate contact with their attorney based on federal statutes
that seek to prevent an inmate from contacting his or her attorney in order to
further or facilitate terrorism).
113
114
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incarcerated client can be privileged,121 prisons often have recording
or monitoring systems in place to supervise inmate phone calls. 122
A contradictory juxtaposition of privileged conversations and
recording devices makes for a confusing and inconsistent
application of the attorney-client privilege.123 The prison recording
informs inmates that the call is being monitored, however, the
recorded message often does not specifically state that this includes
attorney-client phone calls, which leads to a belief that attorneyclient phone calls will still be covered under the protection of the
attorney-client privilege.124
Prisons attempt to deal with this issue by filtering out attorney
phone numbers so that a client can call his or her attorney under
the privilege.125 However, this system does not always work
properly and has caused issues in regard to prosecutor’s obtaining
trial strategy.126 Courts have come down on both sides of the issue
121 See Frequent Questions: Inmate Telephone Access, S.D. DEP’T OF CORR.,
http://doc.sd.gov/about/faq/telephone.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2014)
(discussing that all calls are monitored unless it is being made “to an attorney
or an organization known to provide legal services”). However, it is the duty of
the inmate to request a confidential call when he or she is contacting his or her
attorney. Id. The notices of recording and the rules regarding confidential phone
calls are posted near inmate telephones. Id.
122 Barry Tarlow, RICO Report: Warning: Attorney-Client Jailhouse
Conversations No Longer Privileged?, 26 CHAMPION 57, 59 (2002).
123 Id. Most commonly what happens is that a client will call from a phone
at the federal detention center or prison and ignores the sign that says
telephone calls are monitored. He or she can certainly reasonably believe that
the facility has no authority to monitor attorney-client calls. Lawyers often have
the same belief. The thought process is either that any recording will be
minimized as required under the wiretap statutes or that it is illegal for a guard
to eavesdrop on an attorney-client conversation. Id. at 59.
124 Id. at 60.
125 Recordings Raise Questions About Inmate Rights, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug.
4,
2008,
6:04
PM),
www.nbcnews.com/id/26013015/ns/us_newscrime_and_courts/t/recordings-raise-questions-about-inmaterights/#.VDny_efFE7A.
126 Id.
“We weren’t talking about cursory stuff, what kind of clothes to wear. We
were talking trial strategy,” [defense attorney] said. “There’s no question that
these calls are privileged, and we rely on that because the criminal justice
system would come to a screeching halt if we had to drive to jail every time we
had to talk to our clients.”
Id. See also Rebecca Breyer, Lawyer Says His Calls with Jailed Client Were
Being
Recorded,
DAILY
REPORT
(Sept.
11,
2014),
www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=8e7882bc69f5b80a3d4049a36d827036&c
svc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=d
GLbVzk-zSkAW&_md5=65da9c81e7f630b7e80d6330ea01455d (stating that a
defense attorney’s phone calls with his inmate client were turned over during
discovery); Jennifer McMenamin, Taping Inmate Calls Routine at Many Jails,
THE BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 16, 2008), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-1016/news/0810150112_1_baltimore-county-howard-county-department-ofcorrections (discussing new procedure that attorney’s must write to jails in
advance to request that their phone calls remain confidential under the
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with regard to the attorney-client privilege and inmate phone
calls.127 For instance, where the prison phone system has a
recording stating that the inmate’s phone calls will be monitored
and recorded, several judges have ruled that an inmate who calls
his or her attorney after hearing this message, waives the attorneyclient privilege.128 Inmates and defense attorneys often object to
such a ruling, citing the fundamental nature of the privilege and the
degree to which a reasonable person would find the idea of
inadvertently
waiving
the
privilege
in
this
manner
unfathomable.129
Likewise, an inmate having to ask about speaking
confidentially with his or her attorney appears to create even more
confusion. Adoption of such a rule would lead to greater uncertainty
between attorneys and their clients regarding how to move forward
with privileged conversation because of the lack of uniform prison
standards and procedure.130 The issue is not simply that phone calls
are a safer, more convenient, and cost-effective means of
communication,131 but that prisons fail to provide adequate
attorney-client privilege, otherwise the calls will be monitored and recorded).
Prosecutors and jailhouse officials claim this new purpose will prevent criminal
activities from taking place inside prison walls. Id. However, defense attorneys
argue it violates the attorney-client privilege and frustrates an inmate’s
constitutional right to counsel. Id.
127 See, e.g., United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 103 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding
that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to an inmate’s phone call with
his attorney because the recording on the phone call told the inmate the call
would be recorded, and the inmate failed to ask prison staff whether there was
a way to confidentially speak with his attorney); United States v. Lentz, 419 F.
Supp. 2d 820, 835 (E.D. Va. 2005) (deciding that the attorney-client privilege
did not apply to the phone call between an inmate and his attorney because the
detention facility records all inmate calls and if the attorney wanted
confidential and privileged contact he could visit or send mail to the inmate).
Even though these modes of communication are less convenient, the restriction
of privileged contact to mail or in-person visits does not violate the law. Lentz,
419 F. Supp. 2d at 835. But see United States v. Walker, No. 2:10-186-MHT,
2011 WL 3349365 (M.D. Ala. July 14, 2011) (holding that the attorney-client
privilege protected a call between an inmate and his attorney because the
recording on the prison phone system provided no indication that calls between
an inmate and his or her attorney would be recorded).
128 Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
129
See
FAQs,
ICSOLUTIONS,
www.icsolutions.com/FriendsFamilyHome/Support/FAQs.aspx (last visited
Nov. 13, 2014) (discussing that all phone calls will be monitored except that
between an attorney and his or her inmate client); Inmate Phone Services, ILL.
DEP’T
OF
CORR.,
www.illinois.gov/idoc/communityresources/Pages/InmatePhoneServices (last
visited Nov. 12, 2014) (stating that all inmate calls are monitored, but this does
not include attorney-client phone calls when prior arrangements are made).
130 See Novak, 531 F.3d at 103 (suggesting that an inmate should inquire
about how to communicate under the attorney-client privilege with his or her
attorney).
131 Contra OIG Review of Inmate Telephone Abuse, JUSTICE.GOV,
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scheduling and priority to attorney-client meetings and mail.132
Email communication between an attorney and his or her
client appears to receive the same treatment with regards to a client
calling his or her attorney under the privilege.133 Similar to inmate
phone calls, the issue appears to arise when the lack of
confidentiality agreement is included. 134

B. Email
The creation of the Internet and email changed communication
forever. It also further complicated the attorney-client privilege.135
On one hand, some argue that the attorney-client privilege should
not extend to email because of the higher risk of inadvertent
disclosure, thus obviating any reasonable expectation of
confidentiality.136 On the other hand, others argue that the
attorney-client privilege should apply to email communications
because they are no different from other forms of communication
that
are
currently
protected.137
Comparing
emailed
communications that are covered to those that are not helps to
ascertain the bounds of the privilege.
1. Client Email Not Covered Under Privilege
In Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center Incorporated,138 the
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9908/callsp4.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2014)
(discussing that inmates often use phone calls to engage in illegal activities,
violate prison rules, and contact third parties for a reduced cost using a threeway calling feature). Also, discussing that a lot of the monitoring devices are
often broken, so most calls go unmonitored. Id.
132 Compare Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 828 (suggesting that even though
setting up inmate visits or sending mail are less convenient, it is the appropriate
way to invoke the attorney-client privilege), with Brief of United States II, supra
note 10, at 19-20 (discussing how difficult it can be for an attorney to arrange a
prison visit, and that the long waits and various circumstances that can cause
the visit not to happen make the whole visitation system more than
inconvenient, but unreliable.)
133 See Thomas H. Watkins & Kevin L. Leahy, Avoiding Malpractice at the
Speed of Light: Are Your Email Communications Protected and Secure?, 68 TEX.
B. J. 579, 579 (2005) (discussing the various ways to make email
communications privileged between an attorney and his or her client).
134 See Joshua L. Colburn, Note, “Don’t Read This If It’s Not for You”: The
Legal Inadequacies of Modern Approaches to E-Mail Privacy, 91 MINN. L. REV.
241, 245-248 (2006) (discussing the rise of disclaimer and confidentiality
agreements in the legal context).
135 Robert A. Pikowsky, Privilege and Confidentiality of Attorney-Client
Communication Via E-mail, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 483, 484 (1999).
136 Id. at 485.
137 Id.
138 Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Gen. Term
2007).
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Supreme Court of New York ruled the attorney-client privilege did
not apply to emailed communications between a doctor and his
attorney.139 The case stems from a dispute where a doctor felt that
he was terminated from the hospital without cause, and therefore
was entitled to a severance payment. 140 The doctor hired a lawyer
and subsequently sent emails to his lawyer over the hospital email
system.141 The hospital intercepted the emails and argued that the
doctor had waived any attorney-client privilege by using the
hospital email system.142 The doctor disagreed and requested the
emails be returned because they were privileged.143
The court held that the emails were not protected under the
attorney-client privilege because the hospital email system made it
clear to all employees that the privilege did not apply. 144 The court
reasoned that because of the warning the doctor had no reason to
think his communications would be privileged, even if they were
correspondence with his attorney.145 The court further noted that
an employer is free to instate a no personal use policy, which is
exactly what the hospital did here.146
2. Client Email Covered Under Privilege
In Employers Insurance Co. of Wausau v. Skinner,147 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
held that emails between an attorney and his client were
privileged.148 The plaintiff and his attorney were preparing to serve
the defendant with discovery regarding a case involving the two
parties.149 The plaintiff’s counsel created three separate piles for
documents: (1) responsive, (2) privileged, and (3) to be reviewed. 150
When the plaintiff dropped off the stack of documents for discovery
to the defendant he included a cover sheet that declared any
documents involved in the discovery that were inadvertently
disclosed did not create a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.151
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 438-39.
143 Id.
144 See id. at 439 (stating that “[e]mployees have no personal privacy right
in any material created, received, saved or sent using Medical Center
communication or computer systems [and] [t]he Medical Center Reserves the
right to access and disclose such material at any time without prior notice”).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 441.
147 Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Skinner, No. CV 07-735(JS)(AKT), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76620, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2008).
148 Id. at *1.
149 Id. at *2.
150 Id. at *2-3.
151 Id.
139
140
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The plaintiff accidently provided some emails between himself and
his attorney to the defendant during the discovery process.152 The
plaintiff then contended that sending these emails constituted an
accident, and could not waive the privilege.153 Additionally, the
plaintiff argued that it should be ethically clear to the defendant
that this type of information is not discoverable.154
The court agreed with the plaintiff and ruled that the emails
were protected by the attorney-client privilege.155 The court pointed
out that the confidentiality agreement included on the cover sheet
stated that inadvertent disclosure failed to create a waiver, and it
was clear from the facts that the attorneys attempted to avoid
inadvertent disclosure, as opposed to having behaved recklessly. 156
Moreover, the court concluded that the email remained protected
under the attorney-client privilege, and the accidental disclosure by
the attorney did not eradicate the privilege.157
Thus, email communications, similar to telephone calls, appear
to work within the bounds of the privilege the same way as tangible
documents would.158 If the privilege is invoked and not waived, it is
usually upheld. However, similar to telephone communications, the
lines of the attorney-client privilege as applied to email begin to blur
once prisons add monitoring agreements and non-confidentiality
clauses into the mix.159 This suggests that the use of a prison
monitoring system is what complicates the privilege, not so much
the technology itself.160

C. Prison Email Communication
Prisoners are allowed to communicate with people outside the
prison, including with their attorney, family members, and loved

Id. at *4.
Id. at *8.
154 Id. at *9.
155 Id. at *18.
156 Id. at *24.
157 Id. at *27.
158 Id. at *26-27.
159 See Jennifer A. Mannetta, Note, The Proper Approach to Prison Mail
Regulations: Standards of Review, 24 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
209, 209 (1998) (discussing the need to monitor inmate emails in order to keep
the public safe, but also that inmates do not lose their ability to communicate
just because they are in prison, so this available communication should extend
to email).
160 See Philip Bulman, Using Technology to Make Prisons and Jails Safer,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
JUST.
(March
27,
2009)
www.nij.gov/journals/262/Pages/corrections-technology.aspx (discussing how
technology can reduce contraband and protect inmates in prison). Accordingly,
technological advances have an important place in prison, both for inmates and
for the correctional officers. Id.
152
153
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ones,161 but every form of communication is closely monitored. 162
Now, as technology continues to evolve, prisons are adding more
ways for their inmates to communicate, including email. 163 This
evolution creates yet another layer to the attorney-client privilege
discussion.164
TRULINCS stands for “Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer
System,” and is operated by the Bureau of Prisons. 165 The Bureau
of Prisons introduced email into the prison system because
communication via email is efficient, secure, technologically
advanced, and helped to decrease the flow of contraband through
inmate mail.166 However, the Bureau of Prisons clearly states that

161 See Products and Solutions, TELMATE, www.telmate.com/portfolioitem/inmate-phones-2/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (discussing how inmates can
make phone calls to keep in touch with their loved ones and families).
162 See Luke A. Beata, Note, Stateside Guantanamo: Breaking the Silence,
62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 281, 285-86 (2012) (discussing the close and careful
monitoring of inmate communication and how this monitoring remains
heightened since September 11th due to “the war on terror” and an attempt to
eradicate any terrorist activity taking place in prison); Stay In Touch, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS, www.bop.gov/inmates/communications.jsp (last visited
October 12, 2014) (showing how inmates can communicate with the outside
world while they are incarcerated: (1) phone calls, (2) e-mails, (3) sending and
receiving letters and documents, (4) sending and receiving packages, and (5)
sending money into inmate commissary accounts).
163 See, e.g., Federal Inmates Eligible to Use Email, MESHDETECT BLOG,
http://prisoncellphones.com/blog/2011/05/31/federal-inmates-eligible-to-useemail/ (last visited October 12, 2014) (providing the information that all federal
prisons will now allow their inmates to use email, although it will be recorded
and read by prison staff). Also, for the most part, the Internet is still restricted
from prison with regard to websites, news sources, and entertainment. Id.; see
also Peter Lattman, You’ve Got Jail Mail, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/youve-got-jailmail/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (outlining the basics of the prison email
system, TRULINCS, and discussing that taxpayer dollars do not fund the email
system, but that inmates pay for the access with their own money); see generally
TRULINCS
Topics,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
www.bop.gov/inmates/trulincs.jsp (providing basic information with how the
TRULINCS system is run, including adding or removing someone from the list
of contacts, as well as dealing with technological problems regarding the email
system.
164 Compare Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470 (providing the basic form of attorney
client-privilege analysis), with Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs., Inc., 217
F.R.D. 104, 108 (D. Conn. 2002) (discussing a more complicated analysis of the
attorney-client privilege).
165 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, No. P5265.13, TRUST FUND LIMITED INMATE
COMPUTER SYSTEM (TRULINCS)- ELECTRONIC MESSAGING (2009).
166 Id. at 1; see also Clarissa Ramon, The Price of Communicating From
Behind
Bars,
PUB.
KNOWLEDGE
(April
5,
2012),
www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/the-price-of-communicating-frombehind-bars (discussing the cost it takes to communicate with an inmate and
how technology, including email, intersects with cost-efficiency, reliability, and
security).
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the attorney-client privilege does not apply to inmate emails. 167 The
email monitoring system, TRULINCS, works similarly to email,
however it is technically not email because each party has to log into
the TRULINCS system in order to access or send messages rather
than simply logging into one’s email provider, such as Gmail. 168
TRULINCS was created to “modernize” the prison communication
system and to make it easier by allowing prison officials to view all
of the conversations for as long as the emails are retained.169
Although the Bureau of Prisons provides several notices that
confidentiality is not to be expected, the use of a monitoring system
has attorneys challenging whether that assertion is correct. 170 As
exemplified in Dr. Ahmed’s case,171 email differs from phone calls in
that documents can be sent between the inmate and the lawyer, it
is easier to set-up, it is cost efficient, and it allows for a greater
amount of communication than a phone call. 172 Although the
government commonly argues that the attorney-client privilege is
waived through clicking “okay” on the box that states no privilege
exists, much like the notice of recording on inmate phone calls,
courts have not always agreed with this position. 173 In fact, courts
have yet to resolve whether the readily apparent differences
between communication mediums behind bars impacts whether the
privilege applies.174

IV. EXTENDING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO
INMATE EMAILS
This Section discusses why and how the attorney clientprivilege should extend to inmate email. Extending the privilege is
167 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 165, at 4 (stating in its policies that
“[i]nmates may place attorneys, ‘special mail’ recipients, or other legal
representatives on their electronic message contact list, with the
acknowledgment that electronic messages exchanged with such individuals will
not be treated as privileged communications and will be subject to monitoring”).
168 Christopher Zoukis, Federal Bureau of Prisons Allows Inmates to Utilize
Monitored Email Service, PRISON RIGHTS NEWS & RES. PRISON LAW BLOG
(April 5, 2013), www.prisonlawblog.com/blog/federal-bureau-of-prisons-allowsinmates-to-utilize-monitored-email-service#.VEqYVCgvE21=.
169 Id.
170 See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text (providing materials from a
case challenging the lack of confidentiality in attorney-client inmate emails).
171 See Complaint & Affidavit, supra note 1, at 9 (showing that Dr. Ahmed’s
current litigation is an example of these issues).
172 See Transcript, supra note 5, at 13-21 (discussing the arguments made
by Mr. Fodeman, as well as the statements made from Judge Irizarray, which
promote the need for inmate email).
173 See Brief of United States I, supra note 8, at 2 (showing an example of a
lack of confidentiality agreement over the TRULINCS inmate email system).
174 See Mannetta, supra note 159, at 246 (stating that “it is unclear” whether
electronic communications are treated in the same manner as more traditional
forms of communication under the attorney-client privilege).
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cost-efficient,175 convenient, and fairly easy to implement through a
filtering system.176 Furthermore, non-confidentiality notices should
not disrupt the privilege and should only be used in a manner that
makes it clear to attorneys and inmates that their correspondence
remains protected and the privilege intact. As the handling of email
in the attorney-client privilege context is indistinguishable from
other forms of communication, the decision to not extend the
privilege to inmate email is arbitrary and unsupported by either
logic or case law.
The reasons behind extending the privilege to inmate email are
numerous, especially considering that other forms of inmate
communication are expensive, unreliable, and inconvenient. 177 For
one, email is a quick and easy way to communicate and only costs
inmates cents on the dollar to send a message. 178 Further, email
makes it easier for attorneys to send documents to their clients, and
therefore avoid costly and often-interrupted in-person visits.179 The
Bureau of Prisons can easily separate attorney-inmate client emails
through an email filtering system. 180 Moreover, the burden would
be on the inmate and his or her attorney to provide the correct email
175 See Regulating the Prison Phone Industry, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE,
www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014) (discussing the public
policy importance behind providing inmates with cost-efficient and effective
forms of communication).
176 See Transcript, supra note 5, at 12 (stating “The Court: What I’m telling
you is that there’s no way, technologically speaking, that this system cannot be
adjusted and probably adjusted very simply, and I’d be willing to bet that there
are undergraduates at MIT who could do it today, who could adjust the program
to eliminate this particular issue”).
177 See Ken Stier, The High Cost of Phoning Home: Prisoners Demand
Cheaper Connection, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (June 25, 2014, 05:00 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/25/prison-phone-bills.html
(discussing the high cost of prison phone calls and how it disrupts the ability of
prisoners to communicate with loved ones and counsel); Editorial, The High
Cost of a Call From Prison, THE METROWEST DAILY NEWS (Oct. 27, 2014, 11:36
AM),
www.metrowestdailynews.com/article/20141027/Opinion/141027018
(detailing that inmates having outside contact lowers recidivism rates, but this
is being frustrated because prisons use phone calls to gain revenue).
178 Compare Derek Gilna, Prison Systems Increasingly Provide Email—For
a
Price,
PRISON
LEGAL
NEWS
(Nov.
8,
2014),
www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/nov/8/prison-systems-increasinglyprovide-email-price/ (discussing that in Minnesota prisons the cost of email
messages is 30 cents each) with Tina McCabe, Minnesota Prison Phones: High
Rates, Dropped Calls, Privatization, and Profits, TWIN CITIES DAILY PLANET
(Nov. 30, 2012), www.tcdailyplanet.net/news/2012/11/30/minnesota-prisonphones-high-rates-dropped-calls-privatization-and-profits (discussing that
phone rates are always over 30 cents per minute, and can be even more if made
collect).
179 See Transcript, supra note 5, at 19 (declaring through Mr. Fodeman that
cases often deal with extensive paperwork that needs to be reviewed, and
therefore email helps to facilitate that need).
180 See Transcript, supra note 5, at 12 (discussing the ease of creating and
using a prison email filtering system).
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addresses that need to be filtered, thus reducing government time,
resources, and liability.181 This system would still allow for inmate
email monitoring, but would stop the monitoring once the emails
were between an attorney and his or her client. 182

A. Filters
The Bureau of Prisons should add email filters into the
TRULINCS system to protect attorney-client emails. A simple
Google search reveals endless ways to easily implement such a
feature, and a Gmail account follows the same general setup of the
TRULINCS email system.183
An email filter is a way to separate different emails into
various folders based on user-created criteria.184 Therefore, the
Bureau of Prisons could create filters that segregate attorney email
addresses, once the attorney provided this information, and then
the Bureau of Prisons would still have the ability to monitor all
other inmate emails.185 That way, when an email from an inmate’s
attorney entered into the inbox the filter would separate it from all
of the other emails, which keeps it confidential and in its own folder.
This system mimics the inmate telephone system, which also uses

181 See Transcript, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining the government fear that a
filtered inmate email system may miss protected emails and then these emails
would be sent to prosecutors because “their email addresses were unknown to
the government”).
182 See Brief of United States II, supra note 10, at 17.

Members of the team have no- -I would think in most cases, although it’s
hard to foresee every eventuality, no interest in reading attorney-client emails and would do their best not to read them, I would thing. But under
the current system, the government - - THE COURT: That’s hogwash.
You’re going to tell me you don’t want to know what your adversary’s
strategy is? What kind of litigator are you then? Give me a break. Every
litigator wants to know what their adversary’s strategy is or you spend
an awful lot of time trying to figure it out.
Id. at 17.
183 See Filters in Yahoo Mail, YAHOO HELP, https://help.yahoo.com/kb/pagesln3225.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (discussing the steps to adding a filter
to Yahoo emails). “Click add, enter a filter name, enter the filter criteria:
Sender-the person who sent the email . . . Select a folder to deliver the affected
emails in.” Id.; see also Jack Cola, How to Set Up Email Filters in Gmail,
Hotmail,
and
Yahoo,
MAKEUSEOF
(May
28,
2010),
www.makeuseof.com/tag/set-email-filters-gmail-hotmail-yahoo/
(providing
steps and directions to set-up email filters).
184 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing how email filters
work and their purpose).
185 See Managed Email, PRISONPC, http://www.prisonpc.com/email.html
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (discussing the filtering already used in the inmate
email system).
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filtering.186 Adopting a model akin to the phone system for inmate
emails would facilitate a consistent and secure medium of
communication protected by the attorney-client privilege in prison
and set clear parameters of when the privilege is applicable as both
the email and phone systems would be filtered and organized in a
uniform matter.187
Moreover, such a filtering system would still generate revenue
for the prison by continuing the flow of emails, while also protecting
the attorney-client privilege. In Dr. Ahmed’s case, the government
argued it would be too large a burden to hire a “taint team” to review
all emails and redact any attorney-client communications.188
Furthermore, the government claimed that the TRULINCS system
lacks the capacity to separate out email addresses. 189 However, this
constitutes a ridiculous assertion that can easily be remedied
through filtering technology and research. 190 Filtering can be done
without any human oversight, save for initially entering the email
addresses, which results in a reduction of cost while maintaining
efficient and secure communication. 191 The lack of human
intervention in sorting inmate emails protects against inadvertent
disclosure of trial tactics or confidential information and also
protects The Bureau of Prisons against any attorney-client privilege
or ethical violation.192
186 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing how attorneyclient phone calls are sometimes dealt with in prison and the expectations or
privacy, or lack thereof, involved).
187 See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 897, 900 (2006) (discussing the problems and concerns caused by
inconsistent or eroding applications of the attorney-client privilege in a
corporate setting). The erosion or confusion in application of the attorney-client
privilege causes “ineffective legal representation.” Id. Clients feel as though
they cannot trust their attorney or disclose information, and attorneys may do
less diligent work for fear that anything recorded or written may be disclosed.
Id. at 901.
188 See Transcript, supra note 5, at 10 (discussing that inmate emails come
up as one “PDF” and therefore it would be costly to protect the privilege).
189 Transcript, supra note 5, at 10.
190 See Transcript, supra note 5, at 11-12.
And I find it very hard to believe that the Department of Justice, with all of
the resources that it has with the access to the Department of Homeland
Security and NSA, cannot come up with a simple program that segregates
identified email addresses . . . any other person who they believe to whom the
attorney-client privilege will apply in this particular case, and those e-mails are
identified both by the inmate and one of those addresses is identified and
programmed very simply into a separate folder. And that can be done
mechanically, by a machine, where no human eyes have to see this.
Id.
191 Transcript, supra note 5, at 11-12
192 See Robert P. Mosteller, Admissibility of Fruits of Breached Evidentiary
Privileges: The Importance of Adversarial Fairness, Party Culpability, and Fear
of Immunity, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 961, 972 (2003) (discussing the complex rules
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As discussed above, the issue arises regularly with regard to
inmate phone calls.193 Filtering inmate emails is potentially simpler
than filtering phone calls, because there is not a call to set up or a
recording to listen to after the communications take place.194 Email
filtering protects attorneys and their clients by keeping their
communication privileged, and protects the Bureau of Prisons by
keeping cost and staff intervention down.195 Moreover, the attorneyclient privilege would apply to emails in basically the same way it
applies to other forms of communication. 196 Extending the privilege
to inmate emails is logical after the implementation of inmate phone
calls.197 As more and more discovery is done through electronic
means, it only makes sense that the communication between
attorney and client follows suit, even if the client is incarcerated. 198
Not implementing such an easy, mutually beneficial solution to the
attorney-client privilege problem would be “penny-wise and poundfoolish.”199
surrounding privileged evidentiary information both inside and outside of the
courtroom).
193 See Readings supra notes 126 and 127 and accompanying text (discussing
the monitoring system used with regard to inmate phone calls and how this has
occasionally caused prosecutors to get a hold of defense trial strategy).
194 See Brief of Morris Fodeman, supra note 12, at 3.
The fact that we cannot even learn, in a timely fashion, how to set up an unmonitored telephone call belies the government’s contention that this is a viable
alternative to TRULINCS . . . To the contrary, it would appear to be as simple
as sorting Dr. Ahmed’s emails by sender and recipient—a task that should take
a matter of minutes and hardly needs a team of additional Assistant U.S.
Attorneys to accomplish.
Id.
195 See Clifford, supra note 20 (discussing that the “filter team” was removed
because of budget cuts).
196 See Scott, 847 N.Y.S.2d at 438-39 (discussing the emails were not covered
under attorney-client privilege because the doctor had no expectation of
privacy); Employers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76620 at *24 (holding the
documents were protected under the attorney-client privilege because the
elements of the privilege were met and inadvertent disclosure did not waive the
privilege).
197 See Jail Adds Email Option After Inmates Complain, JOURNALSTAR.COM
(Aug.
24,
2014,
04:00
PM),
http://journalstar.com/news/state-andregional/nebraska/jail-adds-email-option-after-inmatescomplain/article_a91ce76e-7c9e-51b4-b0db-00672ab4e485.html (stating that
inmate phone calls cost substantially more than inmate emails). The article also
discusses that inmate emails are easier to screen than inmate mail. Id.; see also
Poll: Is Kansas Correct to Give Inmates Limited E-mail Access?, CJONLINE.COM
(May
14,
2009,
02:02PM),
http://cjonline.com/news/state/2009-0514/poll_is_kansas_correct_to_give_inmates_limited_e_mail_access
(stating
that providing email to inmates is a way to reduce contraband that enters the
prison through physical mail).
198 See Brief of United States II, supra note 10 at 16 (discussing the
document intensive nature of the case).
199 See Transcript, supra note 5, at 20 (discussing the government’s interest
in using such a cheap, easy, and problem eradicating filtering technology for
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B. Non-confidentiality Agreements
The TRULINCS system provides a message that must be
accepted in order to use the inmate email system. 200 This message
notifies inmates and whatever party they are communicating with
that the emails are not privileged and there is no expectation of
privacy as to the content of the emails. 201 However, inmates do not
have a choice but to click “ok” to use the system, and despite such a
message many inmates and their attorneys think the attorneyclient privilege still applies to the email’s contents. 202 Therefore,
once a filtering system is implemented, the non-confidentiality
agreement should be edited to provide an exception for privileged
communications between an inmate and his or her attorney. 203 This
helps to reduce any confusion as to the applicability of the attorneyclient privilege.204 Even though the Bureau of Prisons has a right to
monitor inmates, this right of monitoring should not invade the
inmate’s right to the attorney-client privilege.205
There is no adequate reason for denying extension of the
attorney-client privilege to inmate emails and including this
exception in the non-confidentiality agreement on the TRULINCS
clickwrap agreement. The government argues in Dr. Ahmed’s case
that the motive behind non-confidentiality of inmate emails is to
“preserve government resources” and has nothing to do with gaining
a tactical advantage.206 However, as discussed above, the financial
inmate emails).
200 See Brief of United States I, supra note 8, at 2 (providing an example of
the TRULNICS non-confidentiality message).
201 Brief of United States I, supra note 8, at 2.
202 See Novak, 531 F.3d at 103 (discussing that non-confidentiality
agreements lead to greater uncertainty regarding the attorney-client privilege).
203 See Brief of United States II, supra note 10, at 2 (discussing that besides
an attorney-client privilege issue, the non-confidentiality clause with regard to
inmate email also raises a Sixth Amendment right to counsel issue).
204 Compare Brief of United States I, supra note 8, at 3-4 with Brief of Morris
Fodeman, supra note 12 at 1-2 (showing how litigation arises out of nonconfidentiality agreements when different sides of the litigation characterize
the agreements differently).
205 See R. Aubrey Davis III, Big Brother the Sneak of Big Brother the Sentry:
Does a New Bureau of Prisons Regulation Truly Abrogate the Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 163, 167 (2004) (discussing that the Bureau of
Prisons needs “reasonable suspicion” in order to monitor confidential
information). There is also a notice requirement, and such notice must be given
before any confidential information can be used in court against a defendant.
Id. at 180. Therefore, the constitutionality of monitoring the confidential
information can be challenged before it is used. Id.
206 See Brief of United States I, supra note 8, at 4 (arguing that government
resources, which are already low, would be wasted separating inmate-attorney
emails when the non-confidentiality agreement already states they are not
privileged).
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expenditure for this technology is minimal. 207 Furthermore, the
comparison of TRULINCS monitoring inmates to a company
monitoring its employees is inapt, because inmates lack the ability
to waive or dispute the non-confidentiality agreement.208 Unlike the
restrictions set forth in the corporate setting, inmates do not have
the ability to communicate with counsel over email by any other
means.209 Even though the inmate is clicking “okay,” the waiver is
completely involuntary in that the inmate has no other option if he
or she needs to access the email system. 210 Also, the inmate
population has generally low literacy levels, which reduces the
ability to understand waiver and non-confidentiality agreements.211
As the judge discussed in Dr. Ahmed’s case:
Now, in this case, Mr. Fodeman has a client who has a high level of
education and so it would be an easy thing for Mr. Fodeman to explain to
him, this is the procedure you have to follow, and he likely will be more
able to execute that than another inmate like the defendant I had before
me this morning who only had a third grade education and doesn’t speak
English.212

Therefore, the application of the attorney-client privilege in
relation to inmates has to be looked at in conjunction with the
person attempting to invoke the privilege. The client controls the
privilege because the privilege is meant to protect the client. 213
Thus, without an understanding of the privilege by the client, or the
attorney for that matter, the privilege is rendered useless.

V. CONCLUSION
Currently, the attorney-client privilege does not uniformly
apply to inmates’ email correspondence with their attorneys. Prison
207 See supra notes 160, 162 and accompanying text (discussing the ease of
email filtering and how it has already been somewhat implemented into prison
email systems).
208 Supra notes 160, 162 and accompanying text.
209 See Scott, 847 N.Y.S.2d at 438-39 (detailing that a doctor knew the
privilege did not apply, and he could have used a different email and not the
hospital email if he wanted the privilege to apply).
210 See Ken M. Zeidner, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client
Privilege: Looking to the Work-Product Doctrine for Guidance, 22 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1315, 1343 (2001) (discussing that under the subjective intent approach “a
truly inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents does not waive the
attorney-client privilege because the client did not intend to waive it”).
211 National Assessment of Adult Literacy and Literacy Among Prison
Inmates,
24
ALASKA
JUSTICE
FORUM
2,
(2007),
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/24/2summer2007/b_literacyinmates.html
(discussing that literacy levels of inmates are generally lower than that of the
free population).
212 Brief of United States II, supra note 10, at 19.
213 Lopes, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
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communications present some of the most important questions of
the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege needs to
evolve with technology in order to survive and provide clients with
protection, and therefore must be extended to inmate emails.
Extending this privilege to inmate emails is cost efficient, effective,
and convenient. Moreover, all of the complexities and confusion can
be mended by imposing an inmate email filtering system and a clear
agreement preceding each email discussing the confidentiality of
attorney-client communications. Although Dr. Ahmed allegedly
committed acts of Medicare fraud, he deserves a fair trial and the
ability to speak freely and confidentially with his counsel. The
interest of justice should always extend inside the prison bars.

